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Abstract 
This paper investigates how the location behaviour of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) is 
shaped by the economic institutions of the host countries. The analysis covers a wide set of 
geographically proximate economies with different degrees of integration with the ‘Old’ 15 
European Union (EU) members: New Member States, Accession and Candidate Countries, as 
well as European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries and the Russian Federation. The 
paper aims to shed new light on the heterogeneity of MNE preferences for the host countries’ 
regulatory settings (including labour market and business regulation), legal aspects (i.e. 
protection of property rights and contract enforcement) and the weight of the government in 
the economy. By employing data on 6,888 greenfield investment projects, the random-
coefficient Mixed Logit analysis here applied shows that, while the quality of the national 
institutional framework is generally beneficial for the attraction of foreign investment, MNEs 
preferences over economic institutions are highly heterogeneous across sectors and business 
functions. 
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Economic Institutions and the Location 
Strategies of European Multinationals in their 
Geographical Neighbourhood  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades the European Union (EU) has strongly intensified 
economic and political relationships with its geographically neighbouring 
countries. Two rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 2007 brought several ex-
socialist economies under the aegis of the EU, Croatia joined in 2013, and more 
countries are currently candidate to membership. In addition, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004, with the aim of creating a 
ring of countries across the Mediterranean and the East of Europe with which the 
EU could intensify economic linkages as well as develop peaceful and 
cooperative relationships (COM, 2004; Wesselink and Boschma, 2012). The 
complex set of connections that the EU has established with a wide range of 
actors in the area has gradually enhanced the economic and institutional 
integration between the EU itself and its counterparts. While full economic 
integration was attained with the New Member States (NMS), the interactions 
with candidate countries and ENP countries are still growing.  
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In this scenario, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) from the Old EU-15 members 
have had wide and increasing opportunities to expand their operations within 
the continent and beyond its immediate borders. The aim of this paper is to 
study the location of investments undertaken by EU-15 MNEs towards a wide set 
of locations integrated or linked to different extents the Union: NMS, Accession 
and Candidate Countries as well as ENP countries and the Russian Federation.1 
This is a highly heterogeneous group of EU members, transition and developing 
countries, the latter two groups having in common their geographical proximity 
to the EU. This entails a set of privileged relationships with the Union, ranging 
from full membership in the case of NMS, accession treaties, action plans within 
the ENP framework, and bilateral agreements in the case of Russia. 
 
In particular the paper aims to analyse the role of economic institutions in 
shaping MNE greenfield investment location decisions once new opportunities 
and geographical options are made available by tighter economic integration or 
more favourable preconditions for foreign investments as a result of formal 
agreements. By exploiting the unique conditions offered by the selected group of 
countries with varying degrees of economic integration with the EU and highly 
heterogeneous institutional conditions, the paper focuses on three key 
dimensions of the recipient economies: (i) regulatory characteristics connected to 
both national labour markets and business conditions; (ii) legal aspects relevant 
in market transactions, i.e. property rights protection and degree of contract 
enforcement; (iii) weight of government intervention in the host countries’ 
economies.                                                          1 The countries here considered are 21, namely: (a) NMS: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; (b) Accession and candidate countries: Albania, Croatia (which joined the EU in July 2013) and Turkey; (c) ENP: Ukraine; Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia; (d) Russian Federation. 
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The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it innovatively combines the 
literature on institutional conditions with the analysis of MNEs location 
strategies by focusing, differently from other existing works, on economic 
institutions and their different dimensions. Second, the paper acknowledges 
right from the start the high heterogeneity of MNE behaviour with reference to 
economic institutions, therefore making use in the empirical strategy of random-
coefficient Mixed Logit (MXL) models (still rarely employed in this field of 
research)2 in order to fully capture this heterogeneity and its drivers.3 Third, 
notwithstanding the increasing geo-political and economic importance of the EU 
‘neighbourhood’, there is very limited empirical evidence on the (evolving) 
position in global investment networks of this set of countries. Filling this gap is 
crucially important for the design of appropriate development policies by the 
European Union, as well as for national governments and a number of 
international organisations active in the area (e.g. United Nation Development 
Programme and the World Bank among others). 
 
The analysis is based on the combination of data on 6,888 greenfield investment 
projects undertaken between 2003 and 2008 by MNEs from EU-15 countries into 
a set of 21 destination countries, and Fraser Institute data on their economic 
institutional conditions. The paper firstly applies a standard Conditional Logit 
model in order to maximise comparability with existing studies and, in a 
subsequent step, explores MNEs’ behavioural heterogeneity by means of 
random-coefficient Mixed Logit. Although we should refrain from any causal 
interpretation of the results, the empirical analysis suggests that economic                                                         2 See Defever (2006; 2012) and Cheng (2008) for previous modelling of MNEs location choices with random-coefficient Mixed Logit.  3 This methodology allows to model variation of preferences over location attributes in MNEs strategies. 
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institutions play a highly significant role in shaping greenfield investment 
decisions after controlling for other economic characteristics of the host 
economies, showing significant heterogeneity in MNEs’ preferences over 
different institutional settings both by sector and by function of the MNE. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature on MNE location behaviour and on the role of economic institutions in 
attracting foreign investors, identifying the main research questions and 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes data and variables used in the 
analysis, and provides some descriptive evidence about the location of European 
foreign investment in the group of countries of interest and their institutional 
conditions. The methodology is discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 presents 
the empirical results. Finally, some concluding remarks and tentative policy 
implications are drawn in Section 6. 
 
 
2. MNEs location strategies, host economy advantages and 
institutional conditions 
 
2.1. MNEs and host economy advantages 
 
The analytical framework for the analysis of MNE location decisions is Dunning 
(1977, 1988)’s Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) eclectic paradigm. The 
OLI framework implies that the existence of ownership-specific advantages (O) 
possessed by some firms may lead to the decision to internalise (I) activities and 
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to undertake operations in sites endowed with location-specific advantages (L). 
Consequently, the combination of (O), (L) and (I) advantages justifies MNEs’ 
existence and their ability to maximize their productive efficiency while 
minimising the impact of uncertain and imperfect markets on their operations.  
 
However, whilst the interactions between ownership and internalisation 
advantages have been extensively investigated (see for example the seminal 
work by Buckley and Casson, 1976; Teece, 1977; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982), 
the study of location advantages has suffered from a number of conceptual and 
empirical constraints, among which the problematic conceptualisation of space 
and the severe restriction in data availability (McCann and Mudambi, 2005; 
Iammarino and McCann, 2013).  
 
In the traditional empirical economics literature attention has been directed to 
factor endowments in a broad sense, including, among other location drivers, 
physical infrastructure (e.g. Coughlin et al., 1991), tax differentials (e.g. Devereux 
and Griffith, 1998), policy instruments (Basile et al., 2008), and labour costs (e.g. 
Liu et al., 2010). Urban and regional economics contributions have focused on 
agglomeration economies, spatially bounded externalities and the geographical 
concentration of economic activity as drivers of MNEs’ location behaviour (e.g. 
Head et al. 1995; 1999; Guimarães et al., 2000; Crozet et al., 2004; Disdier and 
Mayer, 2004; Devereux et al., 2007; Mayer et al. 2010; Hilber and Voicu, 2010; 
Spies, 2010). Furthermore, empirical studies within the New Economic 
Geography have shown that not only MNEs tend to replicate the location 
decisions of previous firms with similar attributes, but agglomeration effects also 
act through demand linkages (Head and Mayer, 2004) as well as specialised 
inputs supply (LaFountain, 2005).  
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The Economic Geography literature has more recently focussed on the 
fragmentation of international activities of MNEs along functional lines. This 
stream of research has highlighted that MNE location behaviour and the 
fragmentation of production processes into different functions respond to spatial 
concentration mechanisms (Defever, 2006 & 2012; Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009). 
The concept of Global Value Chains has been more recently added to this debate 
with the analysis of the linkages between MNEs location behaviour along value 
chains and the innovative and socio-economic environment of host locations 
(Crescenzi et al., 2014). These analyses suggest that MNE location of different 
business functions/Global Value Chain stages may follow different corporate 
strategies according to the characteristics of the investor, the location and the 
specific operation offshored. Besides, the location choice is influenced by the 
phase of firms’ life cycle, leading to a co-evolution of location decisions and 
accumulation of firms’ capabilities (Stam, 2007). Entry modes of MNEs into 
foreign markets are also shaped by spatial heterogeneity through the interaction 
between the strength of local externalities and firms’ competencies (Mariotti et 
al., 2014). 
 
Technological regimes and systems of innovation conditions have been 
extensively analysed in the literature at the intersection between Economic 
Geography and International Business (Beugelsdijk and Mudambi, 2013). The 
international spatial allocation of MNE activities tends to be marked by the 
existence of ‘core and periphery’ patterns according to the complexity of 
activities (McCann and Mudambi, 2005), leading to differences in territorial 
trajectories and growth dynamics and to cumulative causation mechanisms (e.g. 
Cantwell and Iammarino, 1998 & 2001). Since technological development tends 
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to be cumulative in nature and characterised by elements that are bounded in 
specific places, it is suggested that MNEs establish networks for innovation 
across locations by tapping into regional profiles of specialisation and 
strengthening local technological competencies, thus feeding a regional hierarchy 
of centres across and within national boundaries (Cantwell and Iammarino, 
2003). The interactions between regional knowledge bases and MNEs 
technological strategies are investigated in terms of knowledge spillovers and 
externalities, particularly in the European (e.g. Cantwell and Santangelo, 1999; 
Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005; Ascani and Gagliardi, 2014) and the US context 
(Almeida, 1996). 
 
2.2. Economic institutions and MNEs investments 
 
The importance of economic institutions for economic performance and 
investments is widely acknowledged in the political economy literature (Knack 
and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Economic 
institutions affect the structure of incentives in the economy, influencing the 
stability and predictability of market (and non-market) transactions. In this sense 
they play a crucial role in shaping capital accumulation and (public and private) 
investments at all levels (Acemoglu et al., 2005). However, empirical research has 
primarily focused on domestic capital formation, with limited attention to the 
importance of economic institutions in driving foreign MNE investment 
decisions. Institutions influence MNEs’ operations abroad by a) directly shaping 
the returns on their investments and the associated risk (direct effect); b) 
indirectly impacting upon other key investment drivers such as human capital 
and infrastructure (indirect effect) (see Knack and Keefer, 1995).  
Location Strategies of EU-15 MNEs in the European Neighborhood 
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In particular the existing literature – still rather limited in terms of geographical 
coverage – has failed both to agree on the direct importance of institutional 
conditions versus other location drivers, and to reach a clear consensus on what 
typologies of institutions matter (if at all) for MNE investment decisions. The 
seminal contribution by Wheeler and Mody (1992) – looking at foreign 
investments of US Multinationals – combines a number of institutional indicators 
(including ‘stability of labour’, ‘red tapes’, ‘quality of the legal system’, etc.) and 
compares them with ‘classical’ factor endowment, agglomeration and ‘openness’ 
indicators. The empirical analysis concludes that US investments abroad are not 
driven by the institutional environment of the recipient economies but by other 
factors only indirectly influenced by institutions: even though sectoral and 
geographical heterogeneity turns out to be significant, factor endowments and 
openness remain the key investment drivers. 
 
This evidence has been challenged by a number of subsequent studies that try to 
open the institutional ‘black-box’, aiming to disentangle the relative importance 
of specific sub-components of the host institutional environment and its 
‘distance’ from that of the MNE’s home country. Very diverse sets of institutional 
conditions have been tested in different studies under the constraint of data 
availability for different groups of countries and time periods. Wei (2000) is the 
first study to re-open the debate by means of a comprehensive data set on 
bilateral FDI flows: his results suggest a negative relationship between 
corruption in the host country and FDI. Henisz (2000) looks at the negative 
impact of governance costs, while Campos and Kinoshita (2003) suggest that 
bureaucracy quality and rule of law are relevant drivers of FDI. In a similar vein, 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) look at both inward and outward FDI in a large 
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sample of countries, finding a significant and positive association between 
MNEs’ investments and a composite indicator of institutional quality. Meon and 
Sekkat (2004) investigate the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economies 
suggesting that it is political risk in general, rather than one particular 
institutional aspect, which limits FDI into a given country in the area. Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2007) – who look at the link between bilateral FDI flows and 
institutional quality (captured by means of Fraser Institute indicators as in the 
present paper) – conclude that “good institutions almost always increase the 
amount of FDI received” (p.780), at the same time stressing the heterogeneity 
associated to distance in terms of institutional arrangements between the origin 
and the destination country of the investment.   
 
A few complementary studies have looked at MNE location strategies at the sub-
national level: within countries the degree of economic integration is higher and 
(formal) institutional arrangements are generally more homogenous, making it 
easier to capture the impact of other aspects of governance quality. Phelps et al. 
(2003), Phelps (2004), and Fuller (2005) find evidence of the importance of sub-
national supportive institutions in different areas of the UK. Du et al. (2008) 
investigate the location decisions of US MNEs investing in Chinese provinces 
over the period 1993-2001 by looking at several indices of economic institutions. 
Using a conditional logit model the authors suggest that US MNE location 
behaviour reacts positively to stronger protection of property rights, relatively 
limited role of government in business, lower government corruption and more 
adequate contracting environment. These elements provide strong incentives to 
US MNEs to locate in Chinese provinces.  
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Another small number of studies have concentrated their attention on specific 
economic institutions and MNE behaviour. Three key dimensions emerge as the 
core components of economic institutions with a potential direct impact on the 
location decisions of foreign investments: regulatory framework conditions (with 
reference to both labour and capital investments, i.e. labour market and business 
regulations respectively), the legal environment (property rights and contracts’ 
enforcement) and the role of public expenditure in the economy.  
Labour market regulation 
 
Existing literature on the relationship between labour market regulation and 
foreign investment is scant. Using OECD data, Dewitt et al. (2003) highlight that 
unfavourable employment protection differential between destination and origin 
countries is harmful for investment. Other studies suggest that more flexible 
labour markets in recipient countries are positively correlated to higher inflows 
of investment from abroad (Cooke, 1997; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005). On the 
other hand, locating in a country with a more regulated labour market could be 
associated with a firm’s higher productivity: thus, some stages of production or 
certain sectors will tend to locate in more regulated labour markets (Haucap et 
al., 1997).  
 
Therefore, beyond the conventional belief and weak evidence that more rigid 
labour markets represent a cost for foreign investors, it is possible to argue that 
countries with different labour market regulations attract different types of 
foreign investment. For instance, Lee (2003) suggests that the existence of labour 
unions positively affects firms’ greenfield location of new plants in the Korean 
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automotive industry. Delbecque et al. (2014) – evaluating the impact of labour 
market institutions on the location strategies of French MNEs in the OECD 
countries – suggest that labour market rigidity might reduce FDI attractiveness, 
but the magnitude of the effect is limited when compared to other investment 
drivers such as market potential.  
Business regulation 
 
The empirical literature on the role of business regulation in general economic 
performance has only recently appeared (Djankov et al., 2006). In this respect, the 
quality of the business environment is a crucial determinant of performance since 
it stimulates investment. Accordingly, more business-friendly environments can 
be attractive for MNEs, which can operate in a context where bureaucratic and 
administrative costs are less relevant. Daude and Stein (2007) suggest that the 
regulatory quality is the single most important investment driver. Similar 
conclusions are reached by Kaditi (2013) looking at South-eastern European 
countries. Positive effects of a more deregulated business environment are also 
suggested by Kaplan et al. (2011): however, the latter study also highlights that 
such effects are only temporary and much less important than conventional 
wisdom holds. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) conclude that it is not regulation 
per se that matters but the effectiveness of its implementation and enforcement.  
Property rights 
 
The role of property rights is widely debated in the existing literature on 
economic institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) claim that the protection of 
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property rights plays a crucial role in shaping long-run development trajectories. 
First, more secure property rights both encourage individuals to invest and raise 
return rates by protecting against expropriation from the government or 
powerful groups (Besley, 1995; Goldstein and Udry, 2008). Secondly, uncertain 
property rights may determine costs that individuals have to pay to protect their 
property. Thirdly, secure property rights may facilitate gains from trade by 
enabling the mobility of assets as factors of production (Besley, 1995). As a 
consequence, MNEs may prefer locations where property rights are better 
acknowledged and rightfully protected by the legal system. Again there is no 
consensus in the empirical literature on the practical importance of this particular 
institutional aspect: Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) and Du et al. (2008) find a 
positive and significant effect, while Daniele and Marani (2011) suggest that only 
organised crime works as a deterrent for foreign investments while there is no 
effect of other property rights infringements.  
Contract enforcement  
 
The importance of contract enforcement relies on the fact that market 
transactions and the general functioning of the economy are more predictable 
when economic agents know that contracts will be legally binding and they can 
use courts to resolve business disputes. In this respect, Markusen (2001) suggests 
that MNEs benefit from locations with strong and reliable contract enforcement 
since they can credibly commit to investment. Daude and Stein (2007) find a 
positive and significant impact in a large cross section of world economies, Kaditi 
(2013) confirms this result for Southern-European countries and Du et al. (2008) 
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find evidence that better contract enforcement in Chinese regions attracts US 
multinationals.   
Government Intervention  
 
From a conceptual point of view, a large role of government could lead to 
inefficiencies and rent-seeking (Shleifer and Vishny, 1999). Therefore, MNEs may 
prefer location where governments play a relatively marginal role in the 
economy. For instance, Du et al. (2008) argue that stronger government 
intervention in business operations tends to discourage MNEs from locating in a 
particular region. Pogrebnyakov and Maitland (2011) reach similar conclusions 
looking at the telecommunication market in Europe and South America. On the 
other hand, however, governments often buy products from foreign firms, either 
directly or through state-owned enterprises, or purchase goods from domestic 
firms that are vertically connected with MNEs’ subsidiaries. In this sense, larger 
public sector consumption may be an appealing feature for MNEs since it 
increases the size of host countries’ markets. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1. MNE Investment 
 
We employ information on individual investment projects undertaken by MNEs 
over the period 2003-2008 provided by the FDi Markets-Financial Times Business 
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database, which includes all cross-border greenfield and brownfield investment.4 
Foreign firms’ operations are identified by Financial Times analysts through a 
wide variety of sources, including nearly 9,000 media sources, project data from 
over 1,000 industry organisations and investment agencies, and data purchased 
from market research and publication companies. Furthermore, each project is 
cross-referenced across multiple sources and more than 90% of investment 
projects are validated with company sources. In addition, Crescenzi et al. (2014) 
show that investment decisions captured by this database are highly correlated 
with other macro-level data on FDI from UNCTAD and the World Bank.  
 
Specifically, this paper makes use of investment projects originated in EU-15 
countries and directed towards EU New Member States (NMS) and European 
Neighbouring Countries (NCs), the latter being Accession Countries (ACC), 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries and the Russian Federation.5 
Since the aim of the analysis here is to investigate MNE location choices, only 
data on greenfield investment are considered, since the location of brownfield 
investment is clearly a function of greenfield investments undertaken in previous 
periods: hence, only greenfield investment are subject to a choice based on 
location attributes.  
 
Table 1 provides information on new investment projects in 2003-2008 
originating from EU-15 countries in NMS (panel A) and NCs, that is Balkan and 
Eastern countries (panel B) and Northern African and Middle East countries                                                         4 In this database joint ventures are tracked only when they lead to new physical operations, whereas Mergers & Acquisitions as well as other equity investment are not included. Overall, the inclusion in the dataset is conditional on the fact that investment projects generate new employment or capital investment. 5 Investment from the EU-27 and the whole world towards the same destination countries are also employed to test the attractiveness of the countries of interest with different samples. 
Andrea Ascani, Riccardo Crescenzi and Simona Iammarino 
15   
(panel C). It is not surprising that about 62% of EU-15 investors still choose to 
remain in the EU by selecting a destination among NMS.6 In this area, Romania, 
Poland and Hungary are the top three destinations, with about 14.7%, 10.9% and 
9.8% of EU-15 investment, respectively. The trend over the 2000s, however, 
suggests that the huge attractiveness of NMS reached its peak in anticipation to 
the full EU membership and it is now declining, replicating a pattern rather 
typical of previous EU enlargements and restructuring. In the NCs, instead, 
MNEs’ presence has increased particularly since the mid-2000s. In terms of 
cumulative inflows, the most selected destination outside the European Union is 
Russia, with a share of 19%. The rest of the Balkans and the East attracts an 
additional 10% of EU-15 investment in the area, whilst Northern Africa and 
Middle East account for about 8%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        6 Most of NMS entered the EU in 2004, while Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007. 
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Table 1: EU-15 investment projects and quality of economic institutions, 2003-2008.  MNEs Investments Quality of Economic Institutions Host Countries N of investment % investment Labour market regulation Business regulation Protection of property rights Legal enforcement of contracts Government expenditure 
A. New Member States Bulgaria 551 8.00 6.96 5.60 4.09 4.77 17.97 Czech Republic 443 6.43 7.47 5.16 5.72 3.59 21.46 Estonia 142 2.06 5.87 7.37 7.25 6.02 17.58 Hungary 674 9.79 6.84 6.12 6.51 7.06 22.45 Latvia 152 2.21 6.43 6.29 5.88 7.25 18.50 Lithuania 139 2.02 5.45 6.50 5.80 7.35 19.04 Poland 748 10.86 6.52 5.49 4.66 4.27 18.12 Romania 1,012 14.69 5.91 6.54 4.77 5.17 12.19 Slovakia 319 4.63 7.61 5.85 5.98 4.59 18.42 Slovenia 100 1.45 5.44 6.34 6.27 3.93 18.46 Subtotal / Average* 4,280 62.14 6.45* 6.13* 5.69* 5.40* 18.42* 
B. Balkans and the East Albania 38 0.55 5.79 5.67 3.30 5.17 9.31 Croatia 139 2.02 5.65 5.62 4.70 5.40 19.95 Russia 1,315 19.09 6.03 4.73 3.34 7.53 17.38 Turkey 298 4.33 4.09 6.29 5.06 6.16 12.34 Ukraine 263 3.82 6.22 4.08 3.40 5.29 18.18 Subtotal / Average* 2,053 29.81 5.56* 5.28* 3.96* 5.91* 15.43 
C. Northern Africa and Middle East Algeria 105 1.52 4.96 5.62 4.25 4.39 12.43 Egypt 84 1.22 5.01 5.06 5.77 3.41 12.03 Israel 37 0.54 4.84 6.64 6.98 3.46 25.71 Jordan 23 0.33 8.38 6.45 7.18 3.38 22.01 Morocco 203 2.95 3.62 6.09 5.62 4.3 18.31 Tunisia 103 1.50 6.30 6.79 7.00 4.88 16.67 Subtotal /Average* 555 8.06 5.52* 6.11* 6.13* 3.97* 17.86* Total /Overall Average* 6,888 100 5.97* 5.92* 5.41* 5.11* 17.55* 
Source: own elaboration based on FDi Markets – FT Business and Fraser Institute Data
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3.2.  Institutional Conditions 
 
A large number of institutional variables are publicly available, ranging from 
measures of governance to political indicators. Nevertheless, as mentioned in 
previous sections, this paper is primarily concerned with the notion of economic 
institutions. The aim is in fact covering some aspects of national institutional 
settings that directly characterise a country’s economic life and affect the degree 
of attractiveness towards foreign investment.  
 
In line with other existing studies on foreign investments and institutions (e.g. 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; Delbeque et al. 2011), we employ data from the Fraser 
Institute as it provides information for all countries covered in our analysis. This 
dataset contains a number of indicators reflecting several economic dimensions 
of national institutional contexts. In particular, we employ the following four 
measures of institutional quality: labour market regulation, business regulation, 
protection of property rights, and legal enforcement of contracts. In addition, we 
use data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) to include 
the relevance of government expenditure in destination countries. With these 
five indicators we cover three main areas of the economic-institutional 
environment: (i) regulatory aspects (in labour market and business), (ii) legal 
aspects (property rights and contract enforcement), and (iii) extent of public 
intervention in the economy.  
 
Labour market regulation: our variable for labour market regulation proxies the 
flexibility of national labour markets. This is an index encompassing information 
on countries’ hiring and firing rules, collective bargaining, worker dismissal 
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costs, conscription, working hours and minimum wage. Higher values of the 
index are associated to more flexible regulatory settings.  
Business regulation: this indicator includes costs associated to bureaucracy, taxes, 
bribes and other administrative burdens that may discourage MNEs from 
starting a business in a country. As above, this is an index with higher values 
reflecting a less regulated environment.  
 
Protection of property rights: we measure property rights protection by means of an 
index assuming higher values when property rights are more protected.  
 
Legal enforcement of contracts: this aspect refers to the capacity and effectiveness of 
courts to enforce rules and contracts between parties. This is measured with an 
index taking higher values for countries with better contracting environments.  
 
Government intervention: we employ the percentage of general government’s final 
consumption expenditure on GDP, as provided by the World Bank’s WDI.  
 
Table 1 above includes information on the characteristics of the economic 
institutions of the countries under analysis. Institutional conditions are 
heterogeneous across the countries of the EU geographical vicinity but generally 
comparable. The NMs show, on average, higher values of the institutional 
indicators and generally higher shares of public expenditure in total GDP when 
compared to other countries in the group. The Balkans and the East, in 
comparison with the NMs, show lower average values for the economic 
institution indicators: this group includes some countries candidate to EU 
membership, a process that formally requires gradual institutional convergence 
towards EU standards. The final set of countries includes Northern Africa and 
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the Middle East. In this group average values of the institutional indicators are 
upward biased by Israel and Jordan: after excluding these latter two countries, 
the average institutional quality of the area is lower than in the other groups. 
Overall, the countries covered in the analysis offer an ample variety of 
institutional arrangements that is deemed particularly suitable to test the location 
behaviour of MNEs. 
 
3.3.  Other location drivers 
 
The analysis of the link between MNE location choices and economic institutions 
requires taking into account other relevant characteristics of the host economies. 
In line with the literature on MNE location choices, this paper employs several 
control variables that reflect different potential drivers for the localisation 
strategies of MNEs.  
 
First, demand is considered as one of the main factors attracting European 
investors into foreign markets. Both internal and external demand is taken into 
account. Internal demand fundamentally reflects the market size of the host 
countries and it is measured through their own GDP at constant prices, in 2005 
US dollars. In line with theory and existing evidence, it is expected that a larger 
market size will attract more foreign investors (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; 
Billington, 1999). External demand is instead captured by means of a standard 
market potential (MP) indicator á la Harris (1954), as customary in the literature. 
Similar to the internal market demand, it is expected that market potential is 
positively associated with the location strategies of MNEs. 
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Trade costs are controlled for by employing a measure of geographical distance 
between the most populated cities of origin and destination countries in the 
sample: intuitively, greater geographical distance is expected to discourage 
foreign investors (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Kleinert and Toubal, 2010). 
Furthermore, a dummy variable indicating national border contiguity between 
origin and destination countries is included.  
 
Some characteristics of national labour markets are also controlled for. The 
education level of host countries is taken into account by means of the ratio of 
secondary school age population to total population. Notwithstanding the 
existence of better proxies of human capital at the national level, this appears to 
be the only available indicator for the destination countries in our sample. A 
positive relationship is expected between this variable and the location of MNEs. 
Moreover, the effect of average wage is indirectly captured through per capita 
GDP (see Alsan et al., 2006). Indeed, wage data are rarely available for most 
destination countries in the sample and per capita GDP may represent a fair 
alternative. A negative relationship is expected between this proxy for input cost 
and MNEs location behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, different measures of agglomeration economies are considered. 
The percentage of urban population on total population is included to control for 
the relative importance of cities in generating externalities (Glaeser et al., 1992; 
Head et al., 1995). An indicator for the stock of past foreign investment in 
location j is constructed. This measure captures firm-specific agglomeration 
effects that may derive from the advantages accruing to an MNE by locating 
where other MNEs have previously invested. Hence, the existing stock of 
investment should inform whether firms’ past experience drives further location 
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decisions (Basile et al., 2008). In constructing this variable available information 
on brownfield investment is also considered because corporate expansions signal 
to a new investor that previous multinational firms attach additional importance 
to a specific location. Since the mere count of investment projects undertaken in 
previous years does not reveal much about investors’ behaviour, the analysis 
takes into consideration the potential occurrence of a ‘national ownership’ effect 
in each time period, which would suggests the existence of patterns in the 
strategies of MNEs on the basis of their nationality. Therefore, a stock variable is 
generated for each location according to the MNEs’ country of origin: in line with 
studies exploring the role of agglomeration externalities, a positive relationship is 
expected with the location choice (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Barrel and Pain, 
1999). 
 
A set of cultural variables includes dummies indicating whether origin and 
destination countries share cultural characteristics, thereby controlling for 
whether countries speak common official or unofficial languages, had a common 
colonizer after 1945, had a colonial relationship after 1945, and have been a single 
national entity. These variables are frequently employed in studies on the 
internationalisation decisions of firms (Rauch, 1999; Perez-Villar and Seric, 2014).  
 
Finally, national fixed effects are included to control for any unobserved factor 
that operates at the country level and may play a role in attracting foreign 
investment.  
 
Table A.1 in Appendix A provides a description of all variables employed in the 
analysis; all are available for years from 2003 to 2008. 
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4. Methodology 
 
4.1. Capturing MNEs heterogeneous preferences for economic 
institutions: Mixed Logit Models 
 
Following McFadden (1974), the great majority of the empirical literature on 
investment location decisions implies that MNE strategies are fundamentally 
driven by individual maximization choices. In other words, it is thought that 
MNEs select locations on the basis of the expected utility or profit that each site 
may yield on the basis of the characteristics of the host economies. Conditional 
Logit (CL) models allow exploring the effect of alternative-specific attributes on 
the probabilities that firms select a particular location among the set of 
alternatives. The main assumption in the CL is the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA), which implies that the error term εij is independent across 
locations.  
 
An extension of the analysis of MNE location behaviour is developed by 
implementing a Mixed Logit (MXL) model. This is basically a generalization of 
the standard logit and offers the possibility to relax completely any restriction 
associated with the IIA. The existing literature on MNE location choices has 
rarely employed MXL, despite the advantages associated to it. Notable 
exceptions are relatively recent and include works by Defever (2006; 2012), 
Cheng (2008) and Basile et al. (2008). The present analysis implements a random-
coefficient derivation of the MXL, in line with Defever (2006; 2012) and Cheng 
(2008), with the aim of analysing whether MNEs have heterogeneous preferences 
over location attributes when they strategically select a location for greenfield 
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investment.7 The analysis of the literature has shown that it is unrealistic to 
expect unambiguous results. Indeed, this paper aims to test if the lack of 
consensus on the role of specific institutional features of host economies might be 
explained precisely by the heterogeneity of MNEs’ preferences over specific 
institutional attributes. It is plausible that some MNEs tend to prefer locations 
with weaker economic institutions because they aim at bypassing or eluding 
transparent market mechanisms when undertaking business operations abroad. 
For instance, weaker economic institutions might facilitate rent-seeking or moral 
hazard behaviour, the creation of monopolistic positions, or simply allow 
capturing a share of host countries’ public resources, through lobbying, subsidies 
or less legalized channels, such as corruption. This is particularly relevant in the 
case of the present study since the locations of interest encompass several 
transition and developing economies that are characterized by little 
transparency, weak democratic decision-making processes as well as strong 
vested interests that may influence market mechanisms. To take this into 
consideration, random coefficients are attached to variables of economics 
institutions, while fixed coefficients are kept for the remaining location drivers. 
 
Accounting for heterogeneity of MNE locations’ characteristics formally means 
that the parameter β, associated with an observable characteristic x of location j, 
can vary randomly across MNEs.  Formally, the profit equation that each firm 
maximizes when investing abroad can be specified as: 
 
                                                                     
         
                                                         7 Basile et al. (2008) adopt an error-component derivation aimed at investigating substitution patterns among alternative locations. 
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where the vector of parameters β   for firm i reflects firm’s preference over 
observable location attributes x. Thus, in the setting of random-coefficient MLX 
parameters β are not fixed as in CL, but they can reveal MNEs’ taste variation 
regarding location characteristics. Coefficients vary across MNEs in the 
population with distribution density f (β). Following Train (2003), each MNE 
knows its own βi (as well as εij) for all alternatives and select the location that 
offers higher profit. However, random coefficients βi remain unobserved and it is 
only possible to specify a distribution for them8. By doing this, parameters θ (i.e. 
mean b and standard deviation s) of the coefficients βi can be estimated. In this 
paper, a normal distribution is specified for random coefficients associated with 
economic institutions. Thus, the analysis will inform whether MNEs exhibit 
heterogeneous tastes over different economic institutional settings. The 
unconditional choice probability to be estimated takes the following form: 
 
                                                        
  
    
        
          
 
This is the MXL probability, which basically consists of a weighted average of the 
product of logit equations evaluated at different values of β and where weights 
depend on the density f (β | θ) (Train, 2003). As mentioned, the aim is to estimate 
parameters θ, which is possible by means of simulation methods, which allow 
approximating probabilities for any given value of parameters θ. Thus, the 
simulated probability SP is initially computed as an average probability at 
different levels of β: 
 
                                                        8 If the researcher knows βi, this would allow estimating a choice probability similar to CL. 
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where R is the number of draws, or replications. Basically, for calculating the SPij, 
the logit equation (2) is computed with each draw r, and eventually averaged. In 
the present analysis, R=500. Successively, SPij is entered into the log-likelihood 
function to obtain the following simulated log-likelihood SLL: 
 
                                                                         
 
   
 
   
 
where yij=1 if firm i chooses location j, zero otherwise. Therefore, it is possible to 
obtain the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) estimator which takes the 
value of θ that maximizes SLL. 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
All estimations are conducted for EU-15 MNEs investing in European New 
Member States, Candidate/Accession, ENP countries and the Russian Federation. 
Additionally, estimations on investment from the EU-27 and the whole world are 
also run as a benchmark and robustness check in order to increase the size of the 
sample of foreign investments.9  
 
 
                                                         9 CL results are qualitatively identical to EU-15 results and are available upon request. The main MXL results are included in the tables. 
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5.1. Baseline results 
 
Table 2 presents the results from CL estimations. Column 1 provides information 
for the baseline specification. The results suggest that three out of five indicators 
of the quality of economic institutions exhibit a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with the location decisions of MNEs: business regulation, 
government expenditure and legal enforcement of contracts. Conversely, labour 
market regulation and property rights protection are not significant. This 
specification includes controls for market demand variables, proxies for trade 
costs (i.e. geographical distance between origin and destination countries and a 
dummy for contiguity), as well as dummies for cultural characteristics. All 
controls show the expected sign. Next, in columns 2 and 3, labour market 
characteristics such as education level of the population and average wage are 
included. Both enter the regression with the expected signs, although average 
wage is only weakly significant. Finally, we take into account agglomeration 
forces in the last two columns of Table 2. These turn out to be strongly correlated 
with the location strategies of MNEs. With the gradual inclusion of all our 
controls, the relevance of economic institutions evidenced in column 1 remains 
unchanged. MNEs from EU-15 appear to be sensitive to some aspects of the 
national economic institutional setting of host countries. More favourable 
business regulation, a stronger presence of the state in the economy and an 
appropriate contracting environment play a positive role in shaping the strategic 
behaviour of MNEs.  
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Table 2: Conditional Logit estimation of EU15 MNEs location behaviour  Dep.Var.: Location choice (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Labour Market Regulation 0.018 0.028 0.044 -0.004 -0.010  (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049) (0.049) Business Regulation 0.401*** 0.393*** 0.382*** 0.371*** 0.434***  (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) Government Expenditure 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.0623*** 0.067*** 0.045***  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) Protection of Property Rights 0.0017 0.012 0.026 0.010 0.005  (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) Legal Enforcement of Contracts 0.567*** 0.559*** 0.560*** 0.683*** 0.591***  (0.128) (0.129) (0.127) (0.138) (0.139) ln Market Size t-1 -0.455 0.352 1.189 0.919 2.441**  (0.781) (0.837) (0.961) (0.974) (0.988) ln Market Potential t-1 1.728** 2.405*** 2.591*** 2.044** 0.979  (0.860) (0.891) (0.896) (0.911) (0.917) Distance -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ln Education Level  1.291*** 0.977** 0.487 0.709   (0.470) (0.495) (0.527) (0.530) ln Average Wage   -1.343* -0.402 -0.963    (0.777) (0.854) (0.860) Urban Agglomeration    0.149** 0.151***     (0.058) (0.058) National Ownership     0.003***      (0.001) Observations 148,783 148,783 148,783 148,783 148,783 Cultural dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Geographical contiguity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes National dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Pseudo R2 0.193 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.196 log likelihood -17084 -17080 -17078 -17075 -17037       
 
Moreover, our more extended specification (column 5) suggests that internal 
market size is positively associated with MNE decisions, whereas market 
potential becomes non-significant. Similarly, education loses importance, 
probably indicating that MNEs from EU-15 delocalize in the area of interest some 
business functions for which more basic skills are needed. Average wage is 
statistically insignificant. Finally, both measures of agglomeration are strongly 
and positively associated with the dependent variable. This suggests that 
agglomeration economies are likely to play a role in attracting MNEs. Similarly, a 
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pattern of localization that follows national ownership lines emerges. In other 
words, MNEs from the same country of origin tend to undertake investment 
projects in the same locations.  
 
Overall, the CL estimations are in line with the existing literature. While it is 
impossible to find any association between MNEs and the functioning of national 
labour markets, a less regulated business environment seems to attract foreign 
investment. Similarly, with respect to the legal aspects of economic institutions, 
different elements play different roles: the enforcement of contracts is a relevant 
institutional aspect for MNEs behaviour suggesting that MNEs are sensitive to 
the respect of formal contracts. On the other hand, property rights protection 
does not appear to be a driver of location decisions. Finally, the role of the state is 
considered as a positive determinant in MNE choices, presumably because they 
can take advantage from public intervention in the economy or because national 
governments expenditure is also aimed at consumption. These results suggest 
that a further investigation of the heterogeneity of MNE preferences is 
appropriate: thus, the following analysis explores the relationship between MNE 
strategic behaviour and the economic institutional environment of recipient 
economies by means of MXL. This approach makes it also possible to relax the 
IIA assumption that treats the substitution of alternative locations rather 
unrealistically. 
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5.2. Preference heterogeneity 
 
In the MXL estimations heterogeneity is allowed to occur only for coefficients 
associated with economic institutions (variables of interest), while other 
regressors are kept fixed. Therefore, MXL estimates coefficient parameters θ, 
namely means b and standard deviations s, for variables that are specified to be 
random. MXL estimation results are presented in Table 3, where the extended 
specification is run for EU-15, EU-27 and world MNEs (columns 1, 3, and 5, 
respectively). As far as economic institutions are concerned, previous results are 
largely confirmed by the estimated means b of coefficients. Regulation is a driver 
of MNEs location choices in the context of national business environments, but 
not in labour markets, although the mean coefficient for the latter is weakly 
significant when we consider MNEs from the whole world. A strong role of 
government expenditure in neighbouring countries is perceived as a positive 
signal by EU-15 MNEs and world MNEs, while it does not seem to be very 
relevant for the EU-27 sample (possibly because some of these investors are from 
NMS, which may be relatively more deterred by a large government role in the 
host economy). With respect to the national legal framework, a more effective 
contracting environment represents an important location determinant for 
foreign investment for all MNEs across specifications; as in previous results, 
property rights protection exhibits insignificant mean coefficients. 
 
The MXL estimation also provides standard deviations s for the coefficients of 
economic institutions, which are specified to vary randomly. Some of the 
estimated standard deviations of these coefficients are statistically significant, 
suggesting that parameters do vary across the population of MNEs under 
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analysis. Therefore, standard deviations can be interpreted as heterogeneity 
terms and suggest that different MNEs attach different importance to economic 
institutions, explaining the lack of consensus in the existing literature on the 
importance of some of their components. Values of b and s are employed in 
columns 2, 4 and 6 in order to gain insights on the extent of the heterogeneous 
preferences of MNE strategies over economic institutions. For instance, in the 
case of EU-15 MNEs, the variable for business regulation takes parameters 
b=0.475 and s=0.472, such that for 84.4% of the MNE population the parameter is 
above zero, while for the 15.6% it is below. In other words, the large majority of 
FDI originating in the EU-15 systematically locates where doing business is 
characterised by weaker bureaucratic burdens, while the rest prefers to locate 
where business is more strongly regulated. This figure only varies slightly when 
EU-27 and world MNEs are considered (80.2% and 76.1%, respectively). More 
heterogeneous preferences emerge when we look at parameters related to the 
protection of property rights. In the case of EU-15 and EU-27 MNEs, estimates 
indicate that the population is indeed split into two halves. This balance between 
shares of the population with respect to opposite preferences over property 
rights protection also explains the insignificance of the mean coefficient. Finally, 
as far as the legal enforcement of contracts is concerned, taste variation over this 
aspect of economic institutions is far less pronounced, with most MNEs 
preferring locations where the contracting environment is generally certain. 
Nevertheless, there is a very small portion of MNEs in the population that 
decides to locate where contract enforcement is weaker. 
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Table 3: Mixed Logit estimation of MNEs location behaviour     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)       EU15 MNEs      EU27 MNEs      World MNEs Dep. Var.: Location Choice θ Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0                 Labour Market Regulation b 0.007  0.024  0.072*    (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.039)   s 0.015  0.171  0.008    (0.036)  (0.192)  (0.016)  Business Regulation b 0.475*** 84.4% 0.522*** 80.2% 0.403*** 76.1%   (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.047)   s 0.472***  0.613***  0.567***    (0.113)  (0.100)  (0.074)  Government Expenditure b 0.035**  0.021  0.025**    (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.012)   s 0.001  0.001  0.001    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  Protection of Property Rights b 0.002 50.4% 0.035 54.4% 0.001    (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.032)   s 0.229**  0.322***  0.133    (0.097)  (0.085)  (0.103)  Legal Enforce of Contracts b 0.570*** 98.4% 0.500*** 94.7% 0.467*** 89.3%   (0.148)  (0.138)  (0.110)   s 0.265***  0.309***  0.376***    (0.097)  (0.094)  (0.069)  ln Market Size t-1 
 
1.963*  2.688***  2.148***    (1.018)  (0.748)  (0.563)  Distance 
 
-0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  ln Market Potential t-1 
 
1.247  1.080  -0.588    (0.977)  (0.885)  (0.680)  ln Education Level 
 
0.536  1.184**  0.708*    (0.552)  (0.478)  (0.392)  ln Average Wage 
 
-1.490*  -1.997***  -1.662***    (0.887)  (0.729)  (0.576)  Urban Agglomeration 
 
0.146**  0.0754*  0.098***    (0.060)  (0.041)  (0.031)  National Ownership 
 
0.004***  0.006***  0.006***    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  Observations  148,783  165,724  251,276  N of Cases  6,888  7,709  11,745  Geographical contiguity Yes Yes Yes Cultural dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  National dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  log likelihood  -17030   -18974   -29437   Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1 depicts probability density functions for economic institutions by 
employing parameters estimated by MXL: the graphs refer to those aspects of 
economic institutions that exhibit significant heterogeneity terms s. 
 
Figure 1: Probability Density Functions for economic institutions exhibiting 
significant standard deviation in Table 3  
  
  
  
 
The heterogeneity of these relationships, particularly regarding property rights, 
poses interesting questions on MNEs strategies and their motives for investing 
abroad. The source of heterogeneous tastes may be associated with unobserved 
factors operating at the firm-level. Therefore, in order to explore the systematic 
nature of heterogeneity of preferences over economic institutions, the MXL 
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models are run by exploiting information for sectors and business activities of 
the investment projects undertaken by MNEs. Data in FDi Markets provides 
information on these aspects. On this basis, following the NACE (rev.1.1) 
classification, we group sectors into four categories: High-Medium Technology 
Manufacturing, Medium-Low Technology Manufacturing, Knowledge-intensive 
Services (KIS) and Less-knowledge-intensive Services (LKIS). Similarly, 
following Crescenzi et al. (2014), we generate three alternative groups of business 
functions: Headquarters and innovative activities (HQ & Inno); Services, sales 
and logistics (SSL); Production.10 Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A show the 
classification of sectors and business functions, respectively. 
 
Table 4 presents the results for MXL estimations of EU-15 location decisions 
performed for different sectors, whilst Figure 2 plots the heterogeneous 
relationships that emerge from such estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         10 Differently from Crescenzi et al. (2014), we generate three groups of functions instead of five due to the low number of observations in certain MNE activities in the countries here considered. Therefore, we aggregate together certain functions into the same category (e.g. headquarters with innovative activities). 
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Table 4: MXL estimation of EU-15 MNEs location behaviour by sector    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   Manufacturing Services High-Medium Tech. Medium-Low Tech. Knowledge-intensive  Less-knowledge-int. Dep. Var.: Location Choice θ Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0                     Labour Market Regulation b -0.030  0.149*  0.002  -0.246**    (0.128)  (0.083)  (0.112)  (0.123)   s -0.105  0.005  0.013  0.206    (0.688)  (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.244)  Business Regulation b 0.232 62.9% 0.572*** 87.1% 0.383**  0.406***    (0.160)  (0.106)  (0.157)  (0.152)   s 0.707***  0.507***  0.310  -0.014    (0.265)  (0.145)  (0.405)  (0.020)  Government Expenditure b -0.013  0.043 99.9% 0.022  0.086**    (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.039)   s -0.016  0.002*  0.008  -0.000    (0.026)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.001)  Protection of Prop. Rights b -0.189** 33.0% 0.086  -0.011 49.2% 0.046 55.6%   (0.093)  (0.069)  (0.099)  (0.105)   s 0.423*  -0.019  0.528***  0.333*    (0.217)  (0.019)  (0.113)  (0.178)  Legal Enforc. of Contracts b 0.539 72.6% 0.740***  0.725**  0.095    (0.381)  (0.239)  (0.325)  (0.318)   s 0.894**  0.229  0.235  -0.004    (0.389)  (0.221)  (0.234)  (0.025)  ln Market Size t-1 
 
-0.648  4.576***  0.910  0.450    (2.518)  (1.242)  (1.742)  (1.814)  Distance 
 
-0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  ln Market Potential t-1 
 
2.338  0.720  3.135  0.717    (2.752)  (1.593)  (1.922)  (2.377)  ln Education Level 
 
-1.262  0.286  2.844**  0.101    (1.400)  (0.830)  (1.286)  (1.367)  ln Average Wage 
 
0.593  -3.821***  -0.234  -0.905    (2.172)  (1.289)  (1.799)  (1.764)  Urban Agglomeration 
 
0.432***  0.105  -0.029  -0.021    (0.142)  (0.072)  (0.090)  (0.107)  National Ownership 
 
0.003***  0.004***  0.004***  0.003***    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  Observations 
 
31,039  56,795  28,065  27,357  Geographical contiguity 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Cultural dummies 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  National dummies 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  log likelihood  -3497   -6394   -3230   -3039   Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2: Probability Density Functions for economic institutions exhibiting 
significant standard deviation in Table 4  
  
  
 
 
 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, regressions are run for High-Medium Technology 
Manufacturing sectors. The MXL reveals that regulation of labour markets does 
not matter for MNE decisions, while the intervention of the regulator in business 
has an ambiguous impact: the majority of MNEs in High-Medium Technology 
Manufacturing sectors prefer locations where administrative and bureaucratic 
aspects of running a business are less invasive (62.9%), while the rest prefers 
countries where businesses are subject to more regulation. Government 
expenditure does not play any role in driving MNEs’ behaviour in these sectors. 
As far as legal aspects are concerned, MNEs in High-Medium Technology 
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activities do attach importance to property rights protection only in 33% of cases. 
This result might seem surprising since it implies that a large group of MNEs 
from EU-15 investing in the area of neighbouring countries is driven by less 
robust property rights. However, this suggests that MNEs operating in High-
Medium Tech sectors might strategically exploit a weaker enforcement of 
property rights to facilitate domestic firms’ upgrading and learning (for example 
in the area of intellectual property rights, IPRs), while MNEs rely on internal 
firm-level protection mechanisms (see Wu 2000 for the case of IPRs in China). 
With respect to the legal enforcement of contracts, almost three quarters of MNEs 
in High-Medium Technology Manufacturing systematically locate in places 
where this aspect of economic institutions is more adequately protected.  
 
Columns 3 and 4 report results for Medium-Low Technology Manufacturing. 
EU-15 MNEs in these activities react more homogeneously to the quality of 
national economic institutions than those in High-Medium Technology 
Manufacturing sectors. Indeed, a very large share of MNEs considers strong 
regulation in business as an obstacle (87.1%). Also the coefficient on labour 
market regulation turns to be marginally significant and positive, suggesting that 
MNEs in these activities tend to prefer countries where labour markets are more 
flexible, although the statistical relevance of this relationship remains weak. This 
finding is perfectly plausible since we are considering EU-15 MNEs that localise 
in the EU neighbourhood area operations characterised by a lower level of 
sophistication. This is also evidenced by the strongly negative coefficient 
associated to our proxy for average wage, signalling that MNEs in Medium-Low 
Technology Manufacturing sectors are motivated by the supply of inexpensive 
workforce that is generally low-skilled. With respect to government expenditure, 
we find that the mean coefficient b is not significant and the standard deviation s 
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is only weakly significant. Although these parameters provide a figure of 99.9% 
of MNEs driven by more public spending, they should be cautiously interpreted 
given their very low statistical significance. MNEs in Medium-Low Technology 
Manufacturing activities do not seem to be sensitive to the degree of protection 
of property rights, while they uniformly attach a great importance to the 
possibility to enforce legal contracts.  
 
With respect to control variables, MNEs in High-Medium and Medium-Low 
Manufacturing sectors seem to be motivated by different rationales. 
Geographical distance and the previous presence of MNEs from the same origin 
country are the only common trait in MNEs strategies. MNEs in High-Medium 
Technology Manufacturing activities are substantially attracted by 
agglomeration forces, suggesting that MNEs tend to concentrate this kind of 
activities in urban areas where they can access a larger supply of labour and 
competences. Surprisingly, the education level of the population does not seem 
to be a relevant location driver, although our proxy for human capital only takes 
into account secondary education, which is probably inadequate for High-
Medium Technology activities. MNEs in Medium-Low Technology 
Manufacturing activities, instead, seem to be essentially motivated by market-
seeking and efficiency-seeking rationales, as suggested by the strongly significant 
coefficients of market size and average wage. This finding is in line with the 
great majority of literature on FDI in transition economies, which highlight that 
foreign investors search for new markets as well as cheap labour in Central and 
Eastern European countries (Resmini, 2000). 
 
The right-hand part of Table 4 reports results for services: columns 5 and 6 
regard KIS, whilst columns 7 and 8 present results for LKIS. MNEs in KIS tend 
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invariably to take into consideration business regulation and the legal 
enforcement of contracts. Again, parameters on property rights suggest that this 
element is an ambiguous factor in determining EU-15 MNE strategies in EU 
neighbouring countries. As far as LKIS activities are concerned, results only 
slightly vary. The enforcement of contracts turns out to be unimportant for this 
kind of services, whilst LKIS seem to positively react to labour markets that are 
more regulated and to larger government spending. Control variables in these 
regressions reveal that KIS benefit of a more educated workforce and also that 
location choices globally follow nationality patterns.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of MXL performed for different groups of business 
functions, while the corresponding Figure 3 illustrates the variation of 
preferences across them.  
 
Figure 3: Probability Density Functions for economic institutions exhibiting 
significant standard deviation in Table 5  
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Table 5: MXL estimation of EU-15 MNEs location behaviour by business function    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   HQ & Inno SSL Production Dep. Var.: Location Choice θ Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0                 Labour Market Regulation b -0.003  0.069 58.7% -0.078    (0.138)  (0.081)  (0.077)   s 0.011  0.312*  0.037    (0.008)  (0.185)  (0.089)  Business Regulation b 0.328*  0.527*** 83.4% 0.443***    (0.190)  (0.109)  (0.088)   s 0.512  0.541***  0.265    (0.369)  (0.157)  (0.239)  Government Expenditure b -0.029  0.015  0.083***    (0.041)  (0.025)  (0.024)   s -0.002  0.001  -0.006    (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.005)  Protection of Prop. Rights b -0.015 48.8% 0.071  -0.070    (0.118)  (0.066)  (0.064)   s 0.550***  -0.097  0.193    (0.138)  (0.249)  (0.159)  Legal Enforce of Contracts b -0.027  0.544** 92.1% 0.764***    (0.397)  (0.221)  (0.207)   s -0.271  0.386**  0.203    (0.231)  (0.157)  (0.155)  ln Market Size t-1 
 
0.816  4.108***  2.505**    (2.070)  (1.234)  (1.094)  Distance 
 
-0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  ln Market Potential t-1 
 
0.794  1.960  -1.596    (2.199)  (1.522)  (1.433)  ln Education Level 
 
1.849  1.839**  -1.458*    (1.559)  (0.767)  (0.880)  ln Average Wage 
 
0.953  -2.382*  -2.790**    (2.117)  (1.219)  (1.153)  Urban Agglomeration 
 
0.037  0.099  0.116*    (0.106)  (0.069)  (0.063)  National Ownership 
 
0.003***  0.004***  0.004***    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)          Observations 
 
19,994  64,381  64,408  Geographical contiguity 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Cultural dummies 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  National dummies 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  log likelihood  -2293   -7372   -7204   Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 refer to operations of MNEs in HQ and Inno 
activities. Parameters on economic institutions are only significant with respect 
to business regulation and property rights protection. The former exhibits a weak 
and positive mean coefficient b, while the latter is still affected by a significant 
heterogeneity term s that splits the distribution of preferences into two halves. 
Our proxy for human capital, although positive, is not statistically significant, 
likely due to the fact that we only consider secondary education. In general, we 
do not detect strong drivers of location decisions of MNEs as far as HQ & Inno 
activities are concerned. A different picture emerges instead for SSL activities 
(columns 3 and 4). A more flexible regulation of business operations is a positive 
driver of location decisions for the great majority of MNEs (83.4%); whilst for the 
regulation in the labour market almost 60% of MNEs have a positive perception 
of flexibility, the rest seem to prefer more regulated frameworks. With respect to 
legal aspects, nearly all MNEs find that the legal enforcement of contracts is a 
crucial element (92.1%). In addition, SSL are clearly market-seeking motivated, 
and MNEs look for a relatively educated and less expensive labour force to 
employ in these functions. Finally, columns 5 and 6 provide MXL results for 
production activities, whose picture appears less complex than for other business 
functions. Economic institutions have a very homogeneous impact and 
heterogeneity terms are never relevant: more flexible regulation in business, 
stronger government spending and relative easiness in enforcing legal contracts 
represent attraction forces for MNE production operations. Moreover, control 
variables tell that production activities of EU-15 MNEs are attracted by larger 
national markets and tend to exploit local low-skilled and cheap labour.  
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6. Conclusion  
 
In recent years the EU has intensified economic and institutional integration with 
its neighbouring countries, though with different intensity. Some countries have 
become EU members, some are candidate for membership, and some others are 
part of the European Neighbouring Policy. In this scenario of growing 
integration, European MNEs have increased their operations in neighbouring 
countries through the setting up of new foreign affiliates.  
 
This paper has examined how recipient countries’ economic institutions shape 
the location strategies of EU-15 MNEs in a large set of developing and transition 
countries that are geographically close to the EU. The empirical analysis starts 
with a standard CL model, as customary in the literature, and is successively 
extended to a random-coefficient MXL, rarely adopted in studies on firms’ 
location decisions. Results are robust across specifications with different data 
samples as well as across methodologies.  
 
Table 6 provides an overall summary of the results on MNE heterogeneous 
preferences for economic institutions. In line with the existing literature our 
results confirm that the flexibility of the labour market – one of the top items in 
‘traditional’ institutional reform packages – is not systematically associated with 
the attraction of foreign investments. On the contrary, favourable business 
regulation is clearly an important driver of MNE location choices: when looking 
at the entire sample of MNEs large part of the distribution attaches a positive 
value to this characteristic. In addition the heterogeneity of preferences seems to 
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be largely linked to the most sophisticated activities in sectoral (High-Medium 
tech sectors) and functional (HQs and Inno) terms.  
 
The analysis of the role of the protection of property rights explains why the 
existing literature has so far failed to reach a clear consensus on its importance: 
MNEs are indeed strongly divided with reference to this specific dimension, 
particularly in the case of the most sophisticated sectors and functions. 
Conversely, for the enforcement of contracts the results highlight clear-cut 
MNEs’ preferences for more ‘certain’ framework conditions across sectors (with 
the exception of LKI sectors) and functions. Finally, the relevance of public 
expenditure seems to be limited to production activities, where the government 
plays an important role in supporting demand. 
 
Andrea Ascani, Riccardo Crescenzi and Simona Iammarino 
43   
Table 6 - Summary Table of the Results on MNEs heterogeneous preferences for Economic Institutions  All MNES Sectoral Heterogeneity Functional Heterogeneity Manufacturing Services High-Medium tech Medium-low tech Knowledge Intensive Less Knowledge Intensive HQ & Inno SSL Production 
Regulatory settings Labour Market Regulation NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Business Regulation +*** s*** (84%)  s*** (63%) +*** +** +*** NO +*** s*** (83%) +***  
Legal Framework Property Rights  s*** (50%) -** s* (33%) NO  s***(49%) NO  s*** (49%) NO NO Enforcement of Contracts +*** s***(98%)  s**(73%) +*** +** NO NO +** s**(92%) +*** 
Weight of the Government Share of Public Spending +** NO NO NO NO NO NO +*** +/- denotes the sign of the estimated b coefficients in tables 3,4 and 5. Asterisks denote significance as in original tables. 
Percentages reported in parentheses are %>0 in the preferences distribution. ‘NO’ stands for ‘No significance’  
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These results should be interpreted with caution. First, it is important to bear 
in mind that the methodology makes it impossible to draw any causal 
conclusions. The analysis of location patterns is able to control for a large 
number of possible confounding factors but reverse causality is still a 
possibility. Second, the time span covered by the analysis is still limited and 
the global economic crisis started in 2008, as well as the dramatic political 
changes in some of the countries covered in the analysis, call for extra care in 
the interpretation of the findings. Third, even though the innovative use of 
quantitative methods makes it possible to shed new light on the 
heterogeneous behaviour of MNEs with reference to economic institutions, 
more qualitative work is necessary (and is in our agenda for future research) 
in order to explore the firm-specific determinants of MNEs’ diversified 
preferences. 
 
Having acknowledged these limitations, our results provide policy makers 
with relevant insights to support institutional reform and institution building 
initiatives as tools to favour (and complement) internationalisation processes. 
The empirical results suggest that some MNEs prefer locations where specific 
dimensions of economic institutions are weaker. This may appear 
counterintuitive, but indeed there could be situations in which economic 
actors may prefer loose economic institutions in order to gain selective 
economic rewards. This institutional subversion phenomenon is particularly 
documented in the case of transition economies, where political and economic 
elites replicate a system of flawed institutional environments that provide 
them with various types of advantage over the rest of the local population 
(Helmann, 1998; Helmann et al., 2000). Similarly, weak property rights allow 
wealthier foreign actors to benefit from unproductive activities such as rent-
seeking, at the same time maintaining expropriation instruments over the rest 
(Sonin, 2003). The subversion of economic institutions is also intimately 
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associated with within-country inequality, and less secure property rights and 
weaker legal systems favour a country’s power establishment, which aims at 
perpetuating the mechanisms that allow the concentration of power and 
wealth (Glaeser et al., 2003). In this vein, it is argued that political incumbents 
support imperfect institutions in order to maintain their benefits (Glaeser and 
Shleifer, 2002). On the basis of these considerations, often made with respect 
to transition and developing countries, it can be argued that some MNEs are 
oriented towards locations where they can establish influential connections 
with political and economic elites, which in turn allow them taking advantage 
of institutional poorness by obtaining rents or circumventing market rules. A 
similar argument is proposed in the management literature: pervasive 
government corruption can influence the entry modes of MNEs, which can 
find it beneficial to enter new markets via FDI by engaging in corrupt 
behaviour (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Again, this may represent one explanation 
for the heterogeneity of results associated to the protection of property rights 
in particular. However, validating these results and investigating further the 
relationship between economic institutions and MNEs remain an open 
research field and a crucial challenge for policy design in a growing number 
of countries and regions worldwide.  
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Appendix A  
 
Table A.1: Variable definitions and sources   Variable Description  Source  Dependent   Location Choice Dummy indicating location choices among 23 destination countries FDi Markets  Independent   Economic Institutions Labour Market Regulation Index (0-10) indicating the flexibility of labour market in location j. Fraser Institute Business Regulation Index (0-10) indicating the administrative and bureaucratic burdens for business in location j. Fraser Institute Protection or Property Rights Index (0-10) indicating the extent to which government protects property rights in location j. Fraser Institute Legal Enforcement of Contracts  Index (0-10) indicating the extent to which contracts are enforced by courts in location j. Fraser Institute Government expenditure Percentage of general government final consumption expenditure on GDP in location j. WDI 
Demand Ln Market Sizet-1 Log of GDP of destination j at time t-1. WDI Ln Market Potentialt-1 Log of the sum of distance-weighted GDP of all countries c within 1,000km from location j at time t-1, i for each c≠j. WDI / CEPII 
Trade Costs Geogr. Distance Physical distance measured in km. CEPII Geogr. Contiguity Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and destination j are contiguous. CEPII 
Labour Market Ln Education Level Log of the ratio between secondary school age population and total population in location j. UNESCO Ln Average Wage Log of per capita GDP in location j. WDI 
Agglomeration Urban Agglomeration Percentage of urban population on total population. WDI National Ownership Stock of investment in location j from the same country of origin r of firm i. FDi Markets 
Culture Official Language Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j share an official common language. CEPII Unofficial Language Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j share an unofficial common language. CEPII Common Colonizer after 1945 Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j had a common colonizer after 1945. CEPII Colonial Link after 1945 Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j had a colonial tie after 1945. CEPII Same Country Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j have been part of the same country in the past. CEPII 
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Table A.2: Classification of sectors 
Manufacturing 
High-Medium Technology Medium-Low Technology Aerospace Beverages Automotive components Building and Construction Materials Automotive OEM Consumer Products Biotechnology Food and Tobacco Business Machines and Equipment Metals Ceramic and Glass Minerals Chemicals Non-Automotive Transport OEM Consumer Electronics Paper, Printing and Packaging Electronic Components Plastics Engines and Turbines Rubber Industrial Machinery, Equipment and Tools Textiles Medical Devices Wood Products Pharmaceuticals  Semiconductors  Services 
Knowledge-Intensive Less Knowledge-Intensive  Business Services Hotels and Tourism Communications Leisure and Entertainment Financial Services Real Estate Healthcare Transportation Software and IT Services Warehousing and Storage Space and Defence   
Table A.3: Classification of business functions 
Headquarters and innovative activities Business Services Headquarters Design, Development and Testing Education and Training Research and Development  Services, Sales and Logistics Customer Contact Centre Logistic, Distribution and Transportation Maintenance and Servicing Recycling Retail Sales, Marketing and Support Shared Services Centre Technical Support Centre 
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Production Construction Electricity Extraction  ICT and Internet Infrastructure Manufacturing 
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